I. INTRODUCTION
Broadband Internet service is seen as critical to economic and social progress, yet broadband is not ubiquitously available and, even where available, the adoption rate is often seen as being too low. Consequently, expanding broadband deployment and adoption are top policy goals in nearly every industrialized nation as well as in many developing regions.
1 It is not proving to be an easy task. Faced with many impediments of both a public and private nature, progress on improving availability and adoption has proven unsatisfactory, resulting in what is often described as a "digital divide" separating the information "haves" from the "have nots." 2 In the United States, for example, broadband adoption appears to have plateaued even while systematic differences in adoption rates exist among subpopulations. The global digital divide is even more pronounced. 3 In less-developed economies, the hurdles to availability and adoption are especially high and Internet adoption rates remain very low.
Despite differences in the economic fundamentals of nations, the barriers to deployment and adoption are categorically of the same underlying nature. On the supply side, the lack of access to broadband is mostly a financial issue driven by the high infrastructure costs of network deployment relative to the revenue potential. 4 On the demand side, research consistently points to the related concepts of awareness and digital literacy, as well as affordability. 5 An effective policy for expanding broadband adoption, therefore, seemingly must expose consumers to broadband service, do so at very low prices (or even free), and yet secure sufficient revenue for network deployment, maintenance, and upgrades. Thus far, despite much effort and discussion, no government has found an effective solution to this complex problem.
Private companies have begun their own search for methods to increase adoption, perhaps driven in part by altruism and in part by the pursuit of income. In the United States, for instance, Comcast's Internet Essentials program provides a subsidized 10-Mbps connection and low-cost computers to qualified lower-income households. 6 While privately funded, the program is connecting more households to the Internet than multibillion dollars efforts by the U.S. federal government. 7 Similarly, Facebook's Free Basics program helps to address the awareness and affordability barriers to adoption by offering consumers free access to basic online services such as communication tools, health services, educational information, and job tools. 8 Free Basics is available in more than fifty (mostly developing) countries and municipalities, and Facebook's connectivity efforts, including Free Basics, have successfully brought more than twenty-five million people online. 9 Despite the obvious success of these programs at increasing adoption, some questions are being asked about the propriety of the basic connectivity 8. See Free Basics by Facebook, INTERNET.ORG, https://info.internet.org/en/story/freebasics-from-internet-org [https://perma.cc/RH3M-N8ML] (last visited Nov. 27, 2016). Being free of data charges, the Free Basics platform grants users access to the Internet but only permits low-bandwidth communications. Even so, the available content includes sociallyvaluable content such as basic person-to-person communications, news, employment, health, education, and local information. Free Basics is an open platform available to any content provider willing to meet the specified limitations on bandwidth. Facebook manages the software, which is combined with the services of mobile providers choosing to participate in the program. Facebook receives no direct revenue for its efforts. Id. offered by such programs. 10 These concerns often appear to be inspired by the belief that a program must provide a full Internet experience to be socially valuable.
11 Thus far, such claims are based on ideology alone and are bereft of any serious economic analysis.
In this paper, we take a more positive approach to the issue, using economic theory to demonstrate that these price-quality variations are economically sensible-if not necessary-to address the awareness, digital literacy and affordability barriers to broadband adoption. At the center of our analysis is the economic concept of the separating equilibrium, which requires that the "quality" of a free service be sufficiently adjusted relative to market-priced services to make it privately profitable. These programs obviously increase adoption, but we also show that such programs, due to network effects, both increase consumer surplus and restrain the market price of full Internet connectivity. If the user experience leads to the adoption of market-priced services, then the program also leads to increased income for providers, thereby providing motivation to providers to implement the program and increase infrastructure investment.
An additional benefit of such "free-but-limited" programs is that they can increase adoption by "smoothing" Internet consumption over time, increasing the present value of use and thereby increasing incentives for nonusers to make a commitment to the technology. For instance, if connectivity may be interrupted in the future, then non-users may be reluctant to commit to Internet-based communications modalities (e.g., email or Skype). Also, such programs may serve as a type of "connectivity insurance" by providing basic Internet connectivity to individuals or households during periods of financial stress. To illustrate how such programs can play this role, we claims] they want to bring 'digital equality' when they're actually bringing digital slavery or digital apartheid to our poor."); Ajey Lele, Facebook's Free Basics: A Digital Apartheid, IDSA COMMENT (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/facebooks-freebasics_avlele_070116 [https://perma.cc/YXF8-4DSJ] ("Free Basics actually leads to converting the internet, which is supposed to be a global public good, into a 'controlled' platform. For some this even amounts to compromising on their 'human rights.'").
provide empirical evidence demonstrating that the quantity of subscribers to the Lifeline program in the United States, which provides subsidies to consumers for telecommunications services, increases during periods of financial distress. 12 We expect that the value of "connectivity insurance" will be greater for private programs since they often have limited or no qualifications for subscription. Free Basics, for instance, is available through participating operators to all users without meeting or demonstrating income or other qualifications. 13 Also, government-funded programs may be caught up in political disputes about government spending along with fraud and abuse, thereby limiting their effectiveness and sustainability.
14 Privately provided programs are largely free from such concerns.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE BARRIERS TO BROADBAND ADOPTION
Formulating a policy to solve a particular problem requires knowledge of the problem to be solved. Here, the quandary is a perceived shortfall in broadband adoption, which results from both demand-side and supply-side factors. Research suggests that the key barriers to adoption are the related concepts of (a) awareness; (b) digital literacy; and (c) affordability. 15 That is, some individuals are simply not aware of the benefits of broadband or have trouble using the technology, and others simply cannot afford to pay market prices for either the service or equipment required for connectivity. On the supply side, the barriers are financial in nature. 16 Networks are expensive to deploy, and in some instances the revenue potential is inadequate to justify the necessary investments.
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A. Demand-Side Barriers
Survey evidence indicates that it is demand-side factors that are most responsible for the failure of individuals to adopt broadband, at least in the United States where broadband is widely-available. 18 Awareness and digital literacy are the dominant explanations for the failure to adopt broadband. Affordability was also a determining factor, though much less significant than either relevance or usability, though we suspect affordability is more relevant in developing economies. 19 Also, affordability was mostly related to the cost of a computer rather than the broadband service. 20 Availability was not found to be one of the more significant explanations, though such responses are obviously impacted by the widespread availability of broadband services in the United States (a situation not common across all countries). In economics terminology, the awareness issue implies that broadband is an experience good. An experience good is a product for which the value is difficult to ascertain prior to its consumption. 22 Experience goods are very common. Purveyors of such products often craft ways for potential customers to "taste" the product prior to purchase: computer software vendors offer trial versions of their software, wine distributors hold tastings, movie studios provide trailers, and record companies offer sound clips. It seems plain enough that a lack of awareness of the value of broadband can only be resolved by allowing customers to experience broadband connectivity somehow. This experience must also address affordability concerns, which can be pronounced in certain populations. 23 In many cases, using broadband also requires knowledge of how to operate a computer or a smartphone, and technology poses challenges for some users. For instance, below-average 18. See ZICKUHR, supra note 5, at 2; see also infra adoption by older adults is based in part on the complexity of operating the technology. 24 Illiteracy is also a barrier to adoption. 25 Again, getting some experience with the Internet, preferably at low cost, is the solution to such concerns.
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B. Supply-Side Barriers
On the supply side, availability is primarily a financial issue. Broadband networks are expensive to deploy, maintain, and upgrade. An analysis prepared by FCC staff as part of the United States' National Broadband Plan sums the issue up concisely: "[p]rivate capital will only be available to fund investments in broadband networks where it is possible to earn returns in excess of the cost of capital. In short, only profitable networks will attract the investment required."
27 In areas lacking access to broadband, the National Broadband Plan explains that " [b] ecause service providers in these areas cannot earn enough revenue to cover the costs of deploying and operating broadband networks, including expected returns on capital, there is no business case to offer broadband services."
28 Without the expectation of sufficient financial return, broadband networks will not be deployed nor will their capabilities be upgraded over time to modern standards. Financial issues are obviously not limited to the U.S. marketplace but are ubiquitous across the globe.
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In many countries, broadband networks are constructed and operated by a small number of private entities, so prices and demand must be sufficiently large relative to costs to spur investment. 30 In the United States, statistics show that about 90% of individuals have access to 25 Mbps broadband, with the lack of availability mostly occurring in rural areas where the costs are especially high relative to demand. 31 The economics of deployment are, of course, much more unfavorable in developing countries 24 due to low effective demand (from low incomes) and relatively high deployment costs. 32 Deployment is dependent on the relative sizes of demand and costs. While economic conditions may vary across geographic areas and nations, it is always the case that if more availability is the target, then policies must be designed to either increase effective demand or reduce costs (or both). 33 As discussed, increasing demand must address in part the lack of awareness, literacy, and affordability.
C. Social Value
A third reason adoption is argued to be too low is that broadband is believed to provide a social benefit above and beyond the private benefits of the service. 34 If broadband provided only private benefits, then the decisions of consumers and profit-motivated sellers should be sufficient to produce the desired availability and adoption outcomes. Social benefits, however, accrue neither to broadband providers nor their consumers, but to a third party. "Network effects"-where the value of a network is larger as the number of users on that network increase-are a type of third-party effect. 35 If these third-party effects are large enough, then the private incentives of consumers to pay for, and the private incentives of firms to deploy the "right amount" of broadband are systematically too low from a social perspective. 36 These social benefits may be a type of positive network effect (or externality, in some cases), thus producing a systematic departure of the private equilibrium from the desirable social outcome. The persistent and near-ubiquitous pleas for more adoption suggest that these external effects play a key role in the thinking about broadband policies. Public policies for broadband adoption aim to close this gap between privately profitable and socially desirable outcomes, but not all such policies are properly motivated and some have proven failures despite large expenditure levels. 37 32. See SPRAGUE ET AL., supra note 3, at 39-41. 33. Id. 34. See, e.g., NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 3 ("Broadband is a platform to create today's high-performance America-an America of universal opportunity and increasing innovation, an America that can continue to lead the global economy, an America with world-leading broadband-enables health care, education, energy, job training, civic engagement, government performance and public safety."). 
D. Global Adoption Data
While the underlying nature of barriers to increased adoption are likely similar across the globe, different nations face varied economic conditions. Table 2 provides 2014 data (the most recent made widely available) on select economic conditions and communication service penetrations for the world's twenty most populous countries (representing about 70% of the world's population). 38 The per capita GDP in the United States is about $54,000, which is substantially higher than that in India where average incomes are about $1,600 (in U.S. dollars). India's population is nearly four times larger than that of the United States, so affordability is a very serious global concern. Wide variation is observed for both fixed broadband and mobile cellular adoption, and such variations are highly correlated with income. 39 In the United States, fixed-line connections added to about 78% of total households, while mobile connections summed to 98% of persons at the time. 40 Market penetration of both services was also very high in Japan. 41 Compare these successes with India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where fixed broadband adoption rates were quite low.
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[https://perma.cc/3GNU-HD48]; GAO-14-511, supra note 7, at 19 ("BIP status reports have previously contained information that was determined unreliable by GAO Table 2 suggests that mobile connectivity is likely to be the dominant form of access to broadband, especially in less developed nations. 43 In Indonesia, for example, about 5% of households had fixed-line access in 2014 while there were more cellular connections than people (1.26 phones per person). 44 In India, while only 5.81% of persons had a fixed broadband connection in 2014, about 75% of the population had mobile phone service. 45 Similarly, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there was almost no fixed-line adoption but just above half of its population had a mobile phone. 46 Most countries, in fact, had higher adoption rates for mobile than fixed services. The relatively high penetration of mobile telephones per person suggests that mobile broadband is likely to be a much easier transition for the less developed countries than would be fixed broadband. Successful adoption 43 . Id. 44. The statement is a bit loose as we ignore the possibility of multiple mobile broadband connections per person. See supra Table 2. 45. See supra programs for less-developed economies, therefore, will likely be targeted to mobile broadband. From a global perspective, there is much work to do. Some of the world's most populous nations are far behind in the adoption of Internet technology. 47 Given the profound lack of Internet use and challenging economic conditions, expanding broadband adoption in less-developed nations could prove difficult and expensive for governments.
48 Each country will likely face its own challenges. Public policies in one country may not transfer well to others due to very low incomes, high deployment costs, or just a lack of economic infrastructure. Certainly, policy concerns in the United States, Japan, and Germany may not be well-suited, for instance, in India and the Philippines. As illustrated in Table 2 , some countries still struggle to provide basic infrastructure services like modern plumbing. 49 On the supply side, public policy must maintain or enhance financial incentives for private actors, not destroy them. 50 On the demand side, policies must address limited digital literacy and awareness, a lack of relevance and attractiveness, and affordability.
51 What is clear is that an effective policy to increase broadband adoption must address some or, ideally, all of these supply-and demand-side concerns, and these conditions vary widely.
III. A MODEL OF BROADBAND ADOPTION
Where awareness, digital literacy, and affordability concerns are severe, as they are for many of the world's most populous countries, offering an online experience for free obviously has great potential for addressing adoption shortages. Free service, however, does nothing to address the financial needs of network providers. Why then, do we see private-sector programs, like Free Basics, that offer free access to basic online services? What are the consumer implications of such offerings? And, what motivates the design of such programs? To answer these important questions, we now turn to an economic analysis of private-sector incentives to implement a program to encourage broadband adoption by offering free (or low-cost) connectivity. 52. Often, these "free-but-limited" models are lumped in with "zero rating" or "free data" plans, in which data arriving from certain content providers is not counted against a carrier's data cap. While such "free data" plans can also be socially beneficial, these "free data" programs are not the same as the "free-but-limited" programs we discuss herein. As previously noted, an individual's demand for broadband service differs along many dimensions, but the key factors determining whether broadband is used or not include: (a) awareness of the Internet's value; (b) digital literacy, or the skills and abilities necessary to use broadband technology; and (c) affordability concerns, which may relate to income differences. 53 In the interest of keeping our scenario simple, but informative, we imagine that there are two types of consumers for broadband access services-those that are aware, literate, and have a "high demand" (H) and those that are neither aware nor literate and thus have a "low demand" (L) for broadband service. More formally, the H buyers have a higher willingness to pay for broadband than the L buyers at all quality levels, and they have a higher marginal willingness to pay for quality improvements.
On the supply side, we assume, for convenience and to comport with earlier research on this topic, that there is a single seller of broadband service. 54 This seller is able to affect the quality of the services it sells, where quality is regarded as a vertical feature of service; that is, all buyers prefer a higher to a lower quality. 55 Quality is costly, of course, and the firm is permitted to set the prices and qualities of service free of direct regulation.
In this setting, the seller faces the challenge of designing service offerings to maximize its profits. In particular, given the two types of consumers, the seller faces the challenge of deciding whether to offer a single type of service, or two different types, each tailored for the different customer types. That is, should the seller offer a lower-quality, lower-priced service to the type L customers? The fundamental problem for the seller is that the H buyers will be sorely tempted by the lower-priced offering the seller intends for the L customers, thereby costing the seller some of its paying customers. In a seminal paper from 1978, Michael Mussa and Sherwin Rosen show that the solution to this problem-absent some effective mechanism (e.g., income or age certification) by which to prohibit defection-is to reduce the quality (and price) of the offering intended for the L buyers in the proper manner, so as to achieve market separation through the self-interested behavior of buyers.
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Our model is not merely a restatement of Mussa and Rosen, however, though their results are very informative. To this now-standard model of quality choice we incorporate two additional nuances relevant to broadband adoption. First, we add a type of network effects to the model by permitting the broadband consumer's utility to rise with the number of broadband users. Second, to account for the claim that awareness and literacy are barriers to broadband adoption, we allow for an experience with Internet service to change some type L customers into type H customers. That is, a nonpaying customer of a low-quality service may become a paying customer of a highquality service as a result of the experience with the low-quality service.
A. Choosing the Number of Quality Tiers
Suppose that the two types of consumers (H, L) have equal unit masses: NL, NH ∈ {0, 1}. 57 Hence, NL would equal one if the low-type consumers purchase broadband service and NL would equal zero if they did not purchase any service (the good is either purchased or it is not; quantity does not vary for purchases). The same is true for NH, or the high-type consumers. Recall that the high-type consumers place a larger valuation on quality compared to low-type consumers. Consumers must also obtain a piece of equipment to use broadband service, and we assume that both types of consumers use the same equipment (at least, we assume the equipment costs the same). Specifically, we assume the following expressions for consumer utility:
where Q denotes the quality of service, P denotes the price of service, and we assume hardware devices cost three (3) units merely to calibrate the example. Looking at Equation (1), we see that the "utility" or satisfaction derived by the L-type customer is equal to the number of users (NL + NH) plus the quality of the service (Q) less the price paid for the service and the equipment required to use it (P + 3). Also, in keeping with the awareness issue, notice that type H customers value quality twice as much as type L customers (2Q rather than just Q) and that both types of consumers experience a positive network effect from having other consumers using broadband service (utility is a function of both types of N). To complete the setup, we assume a very simple quadratic cost function of providing a given quality of service per unit of consumer mass: 57. We will simplify the proceedings by assuming that the numbers of H and L customers are equal, although this is probably an excessive simplification.
Again, purely for convenience, we calibrate the cost of a single quality unit to zero. In light of the two customer types, the service provider faces an important and consequential choice: should it offer one service contract or two of different qualities? If it offers a single contract, then this contract will appeal either to only the H buyers or else to both H and L types (the contract could appeal to nobody, but we ignore this case). Therefore, the real issue is whether the firm is better off attracting both types or only those with a high demand for broadband. To attract both types, the firm must select price and quality so that the welfare UL in Equation (1) is nonnegative. As further inspection shows, any contract that does this will automatically attract the higher income buyers (due the higher valuation of quality). Alternatively, the firm could ignore the L buyers and simply design an offering to maximize its profits from the type H customers. In this latter case, higher prices and quality would presumably be offered, at the cost of foreclosing the network to the type L consumers.
To solve the firm's problem, it is useful first to solve the simpler problem: what if the firm could offer specific services to each group and did not have to worry about the type H buyers selecting the lower priced service intended for the L types? This scenario would be ideal from the firm's perspective, but is often not feasible in reality without some effective mechanism by which to keep the two types separate. 58 Still, the analysis is important.
So, suppose the firm was dealing with each of the two consumer types in isolation. Assuming reservation utilities are uniformly zero (a consumer gets zero utility if the service is not purchased), the firm would raise prices until the reservation utilities were exactly met:
The profit rate per market segment would be:
58. Comcast's Internet Essentials program accomplishes such a division (and forecloses arbitrage) by offering a discounted broadband program only to families with at least one child who qualifies for the National School Lunch Program (among other requirements). The simple quadratic structure in quality immediately implies that the profitmaximizing level of quality for the two types in isolation are:
, which renders margins of zero for L-type and 1.5 for H-type consumers if both types buy the service. Notice that if the H types do not purchase service (NH = 0), then the L types could only be served at a loss (negative price): by Equation (4), the price is −1.0. But, if the H types are in the market, then the network externality is sufficient to allow the low types to be served at break-even (at zero price for a free, low-quality service). Hence, if the firm is restricted to only one quality level of service, then the low-type consumers will be priced out of the market (NL = 0) and the firm will set . This results in a profit for the firm of 0.5 and zero consumer surplus (the latter is an artifact of the specification).
Next, suppose the firm is allowed to offer two quality levels and thus potentially serve both customer types. From above we see that the best the firm can do with L-type consumers is to simply give away a very basic level of service, . If an H-type consumer were to consume that basic free service, then they would receive one unit of utility: UH = (1 + 1) + 2 -(0 + 3) = 1. Hence, the best the firm would be able to achieve with the H-types is . The firm cannot extract a higher price from the H-types because they would switch to the free, low-quality service at any price above 2 units, as the low-quality service acts as a type of competitor to the high-quality service. The firm will once again make a halfunit of profit from the high types. However, the H-types will now earn one unit of consumer surplus due to the increased network effect from the presence of the L-types are on the network (NL = 1, NH = 1). Consumers as a whole would clearly prefer two quality tiers because surplus is higher, but the firm would be indifferent in terms of profits between the single-quality regime and the two-quality regime.
To summarize, we may say that the sale of a reduced-price, lower "quality" service can improve social welfare, even when we restrict our attention solely to the consumer surplus analysis and ignore the probable additional social benefits (i.e., external effects) of a more connected society. The crucial issue, though, is that the ability of the firm to do this depends on its ability to offer differentiated services, one with higher prices and quality, and the other basic service with a low or zero price. This limitation is, in fact, crucial: the seller does not offer a basic service out of any animus toward the low income or inexperienced consumers. Rather, the purpose of the differentiation is to dissuade the rich and/or experienced from buying what is intended for the poor and/or inexperienced. If regulations mean that differentiated services cannot be offered, then the seller is deprived of the ability to introduce quality differentials to support expansion of service to the lower end of the market. A prohibition on the free, basic service leaves only the high-value customer being served, which reduces consumer surplus and could lead to higher prices for those that do subscribe.
B. Awareness, Literacy, and Promotion
Of course, there are other incentives the seller may have to offer a free basic service that are not included in the example above. Even putting aside the charitable impulse (i.e., in the analysis above, the seller is indifferent between selling to both or to just the high types), it is quite plausible that a seller might wish to engage in a form of "introductory pricing" in order to overcome resistance born of unfamiliarity with online access. In developing economies, where adoption rates remain very low, this sort of unfamiliarity seems likely for large blocks of potential users. 59 From the firm's point of view, these users may transition to full-service accounts once they experience the benefits of service introduced by the free offering. 60 Indeed, evidence from Facebook's Free Basics program indicates that about 50% of Free Basics users upgrade to a paid data plan in the first month. 61 This is a simple argument and can be illustrated by the model using a simple modification. Suppose a fraction θ of the L-type consumers quickly experience an "acquired taste" once exposed to broadband service and their quality valuation rises to become identical to that of an H-type consumer. In this case, the firm would strictly prefer (just like consumers) the two-quality regime as profits would be 2 / ) 1 (   instead of just one-half unit under the single-quality regime (under which the L types are never exposed because they are priced out of the market). In other words, if there exists any introductory benefit of the sort contemplated here, then it works in the same direction, incentive-wise, as suggested in the example. In particular, it is often the case that introductory offers for websites, software, and memberships for clubs or organizations offer a less-than-complete menu of services. 62 For the reasons exposed in the analysis above, the purpose of a free and basic version of a product (or a trial that expires) is to make it low risk for the potential buyer to examine the service, not to provide a service in competition with the standard offering. 63 
C. Summary
The analysis presented above demonstrates why a private-sector firm would offer a free online service, and why the quality of the free service must be below that of the standard market offering. Given the zero price, the seller must sufficiently reduce the capabilities of the zero-price plan to discourage defection by the paying customers who ensure the financial viability of the network. 64 Due to the network effect, consumer benefit from the expanded adoption as more consumers get online. 65 Thus, the program is good for consumers, and certainly good for society as a whole (especially given external effects). 66 The seller is indifferent unless some of the L-type consumers, as a consequence of their experience, eventually buy the higher quality service. 67 Evidence suggests that they do, thereby providing the profit motive for the program. 68 Criticism of such programs, due largely to the limited capabilities of the free service, do not appear to have much merit. We stress, however, that the example described here is an extremely simple one, and it is not intended to establish any particular policy beyond the most obvious and prudent: before such programs are criticized or even banned, it is sensible to examine the circumstances under discussion rather than rely on ideological principle. It seems likely that naked prohibitions against "free-but-limited" access services will prohibit firms from offering very low-cost services to address the awareness, literacy, and affordability barriers to Internet adoption. 69 If all customers are required to have services fully equal in quality to the standard fare, then the zero-price offerings would attract high-demand users, rendering the entire exercise unprofitable in the extreme. 70 Thus, efforts to impede such programs will lead to a lack of Internet access for the least aware and poorest customers, an outcome with no apparent benefits. 71 
IV. ADDITIONAL WAYS "FREE-BUT-LIMITED" ACCESS ENCOURAGES ADOPTION
Our foregoing analysis shows how deeply-discounted or even free access to the Internet can address the barriers to Internet adoption while also being profitable for private companies to offer. Availability of a steeply discounted, lower "quality" service is shown to increase consumer surplus and improve social welfare more generally. 72 In terms of economic analysis, the analysis presented above represents a necessary first step in understanding the fundamental economics of adoption programs like Facebook's Free Basics.
There are, of course, other mechanisms by which adoption programs may influence Internet use and economic well-being. We address two here with some formality. First, we demonstrate how such programs can increase adoption by "smoothing" Internet consumption over time, increasing the present value of use and thereby increases incentives for non-users to make a commitment to the technology. Second, and related somewhat to the former, we provide econometric evidence showing that "free-but-limited" programs can provide a type of "connectivity insurance," keeping consumers subscribed to communications services during periods of financial distress.
A. Increasing Adoption by Ensuring Continuous Access
In a community where electricity is only intermittently available, consumers may still be interested in air conditioning, televisions, and lamps; however, it probably would not make much sense to invest in, say, a chest freezer. Video entertainment is not a perishable product, but any investment in foods that require freezing would be wasted at the next outage. In the same way, if consumers feel that their Internet connectivity and access to basic services could be interrupted in the future (at least, for an extended period), then their willingness to make a commitment to Internet technology may be diminished, other things constant.
We need look no further than to decades-old models of telephone adoption for a theoretical analysis of this problem. 73 A concise summary of this theoretical work is as follows. Consumer must pay some positive price to obtain access to the communications network (r), and once access is obtained, the consumer will communicate q messages at a per-message price of p. The net benefit to the consumer of using the communications network is the value from consuming the q messages less the price paid for them (pq price r, then the consumer subscribes to the system (when S > r), otherwise the consumer does not subscribe.
While we do not formalize an extension of the access model to fit Internet adoption and interruptible service, the results of such an analysis are not terribly difficult to predict. If the service could be interrupted in the future (e.g., a negative income shock makes it unaffordable), then the consumer will perceive the system to be of less value because fewer messages can be sent.
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Other things constant, a positive expectation of interrupted service reduces the incentive of a consumer to purchase access.
Practically, it is not difficult to see how such a framework applies with even greater effect to Internet adoption. When a consumer begins using the Internet, the communications applications adopted by the consumer (i.e., email, Facebook, Skype, and so forth) become a contact point recognized by other users. For instance, an email address may be the chosen modality of communications between a job applicant and the potential or actual employer. 75 If the applicant lost connectivity, even for a short interval, then important communications may be missed (some forms of communications are "perishable"). Therefore, uncertain access poses a risk to the commitment to use the Internet as a primary communications modality, which is a key source of value from Internet use. If so, non-Internet-based communications modalities may be preferred. By offering connectivity to basic services at a zero price, adoption programs like Free Basics (and other discounted, limited service options) maintain, in large part, the integrity of the communications modality and the future stream of net benefits from access, thereby encouraging adoption.
B. Adoption Programs as Connectivity Insurance
Globalization and technology have made economic activity across the globe very volatile. Nearly every country has experienced economic stress, with a global recession in 2008 and continued struggles in many countries.
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These economic downturns lead to higher unemployment and greater 74. In the information systems community, the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is used to predict consumer usage of a technology based on the broad categories of "perceived usefulness" and "perceived ease of use," two concepts that essentially boil down to a costbenefit analysis based on objective and subjective effort. poverty. 77 At the same time, finding employment and new business opportunities is increasingly dependent on Internet connectivity. 78 When unemployment hits, however, paying for an Internet connection becomes difficult, and many subscribers are forced to abandon the service. Having an option for low-cost or free online access to basic services, even if with limited capabilities, softens the blow and provides for economic opportunity during periods of economic stress. Such programs provide a type of "connectivity insurance," ensuring that financial stress does not persist as long or as deeply as it might without any connectivity. 79 Is there any evidence to support such a role for these programs? In the United States, the federal and some state governments' Lifeline program offers financial support for low-income households in the form of a monthly subsidy for the purchase of wireline or mobile wireless telephone services (but not both). 80 Whether or not these programs provide a type of "connectivity insurance" can be determined by evaluating the relationship between the use of such programs and periods of financial distress. To do so, we gathered annual data on state-level subscriptions (per capita) to such programs over the period 1998 through 2014 as well as data on state-level unemployment and poverty rates. 81 Using time-series econometric techniques, we then test whether subscriptions rise during periods of financial stress.
The econometric model is quite sophisticated and the full details are beyond the scope of this paper. 82 Our procedure involves the use of principal components to estimate a common latent component of subscriptions as well as idiosyncratic components analysis (dynamic factor analysis) for each state. The technique is likewise applied to the data on unemployment and poverty. A bivariate vector autoregressive model is then used to study the dynamic adjustment of subscriptions in response to structural shocks to the unemployment and poverty variables. We found a substantial degree of heterogeneity across states in the estimated factor loading coefficients, a likely consequence of variations in state programs that implement the Lifeline program. The common component for the poverty and unemployment rates and associated factor loading coefficients are more homogenous, and the dynamics are closely associated with the recent financial crises in 2001 and 2008 .
While the analysis is rich in implications, our interest primarily relates to the response of Lifeline subscriptions to unemployment and poverty shocks. Such responses are computed using Impulse Response Functions for a 1% structural shock to the unemployment and poverty common components. We found the responses to be robust to different lag structures. Though we obtained qualitatively similar results using the unemployment and poverty common components, we note that the results for unemployment are weaker than those with the poverty rate. The Impulse Response Functions indicate that for a 1% shock to the poverty component, the subscription component increases by 0.6% on impact, then increase by over 1% in about two years. The responses are statistically significant based on the one standard deviation confidence bands of the responses computed using 500 bootstrap replications. For a 1% shock to unemployment, the subscription component rises by about 0.2% on impact, then increases by over 0.6% in about two years. The response is also statistically significant. These results suggest that the use of programs targeted at low-income households is responsive to changes in unemployment and poverty rates. The Lifeline program appears to provide a type of "connectivity insurance" to American households experiencing financial distress.
While there is insufficient data to assess the details, we suspect a program like Free Basics would be even more effective in providing broadband "connectivity insurance." The Lifeline program requires households to certify eligibility, which is not an easy task for many lowincome households. In contrast, Free Basics is available through participating operators to everyone. 83 Additionally, government programs have faced a significant amount of concern over fraud and abuse, 84 concepts that have no meaning for programs such as Free Basics. Government programs such as 82 Lifeline have also been subject to a great deal of political hostility. 85 For each subscriber, the subsidies are also quite small (about $9.25 per line), forcing many of its users to pay positive prices for services. 86 Free Basics is free and enables users to experience the benefits of being online, thereby promoting the adoption of higher-quality data services. Unlike Lifeline and other government programs, private-sector programs have no budgetary consequence for government and thus avoid most, but not all, political interference and related complications.
Although the Lifeline program is in the early stages of expanding to subsidize broadband service, this effort has illustrated all of the inherent problems with public sector administration that private companies can avoid. The FCC's March 2016 decision to expand Lifeline to broadband was fraught with political contention, and the December 2016 roll-out has been hindered by pricing difficulties and major carriers opting out of participation. 87 
V. CONCLUSION
Getting the world online is no easy task. Building and maintaining broadband networks is a tremendously expensive endeavor; and even where networks are built, they provide less benefit if vast swaths of the Earth's population do not see any value in using them. Research indicates that awareness, digital literacy, and affordability are the key barriers to adoption. 88 A successful adoption program, whether implemented by the public or private sector, must expose non-users to the benefits of being online and do so at low prices (or even free). While some governments have attempted to spur deployment and adoption, the public sector operates with limited resources, particularly in developing economies. 89 Recently, private sector programs have been deployed to provide consumers with broadband access at low prices. For example, Facebook's Free Basics program offers users free access to basic online services in order to help address the awareness and affordability barriers to broadband adoption. Evidence from that program indicates that many users of the free service quickly upgrade to market-priced Internet services, a consequence of overcoming the awareness barrier.
Why do private firms offer free services? While altruism may certainly be a key motivator, our study also shows how these programs can be profitable to providers under plausible conditions. Specifically, the free, basic services must be sufficiently different from market-priced services to prevent higher-income users with more broadband experience from defecting to the basic service of the higher income, more experienced users. Absent the ability to freely set the "quality" of the free service, consumers with low demand, either due to a lack of awareness or income, will not be served. With a twotier program, however, all types of consumers can experience the benefits of online access services, increasing consumer surplus and infrastructure investment.
Such programs also serve as a basic level of connectivity for consumers experiencing financial distress, rendering them unable to pay for marketpriced services. We demonstrate that non-users may be reluctant to adopt the Internet for fear of service interruption, perhaps fearing a negative income shock that renders service unaffordable in the future. For example, using email as a primary communications modality is risky if messages cannot be received when service is not available. "Free-but-limited" services can thus increase adoption by "smoothing" Internet consumption over time, increasing the present value of Internet access for users. We also offer some new econometric evidence that these programs may serve as a type of "connectivity insurance." Using subscriptions from the Lifeline program in the United States, we find that the use of the subsidy program rises with increases in unemployment and poverty. We suspect that private programs such as Facebook's Free Basics may even be more effective than public programs, since the private programs are not directly influenced by political concerns and are available through participating operators to everyone for free without eligibility criteria.
